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Abstract I present the case that the topic of the evolution
of human morality is essential to any complete introductory
biology course. This statement of rationale is accompanied
(in complementary contributions) by: (1) a textbook-styled
survey of recent literature on the topic, suitable for classroom
use or as background for any teacher (Allchin 2009c); (2) a
survey of current textbooks and available resources, with a
brief discussion of teaching strategies (Allchin 2009d); and
(3) a set of online resources (images and presentations) for
classroom instruction (Allchin 2009a).
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Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked
social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral
sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers
had become as well developed . . . as in man.
—Charles Darwin, Descent of Man
Ironically, evolutionists and their creationist critics often
seem to agree on one thing: that evolution implies moral
relativism (Brem et al. 2003). What a dismal prospect for
human society, if true! But if Darwin's claim in Descent of
Man (above) is even vaguely correct, such dire conclusions
seem unwarranted. Indeed, substantial scientific research in
the past several decades now greatly informs our under-
standing of the natural history of morality, perhaps the
quintessential question of human evolution. While science
cannot dictate specific values or moral principles, it can,
nonetheless, explain several dimensions of morality as a
form of behavior. A naturalized context can inform moral
discourse and choice. Not least, perhaps, such knowledge is
critical to rescuing Darwinism (as science) from the awful
shadow of the political ideology often called, inappropri-
ately, "Social Darwinism."
Here, I address the role of this topic in a general biology
curriculum, presenting the case that no introductory course
can now be considered complete without touching upon a
handful of central concepts and some illustrative cases of the
evolution of morality. A suite of concerns motivates the topic:
1. intellectually, the need to address perhaps the most
significant cultural dimension of evolution, itself the
most central biological concept;
2. culturally, the need to demythologize biological deter-
minism (presumed to structure human society) and to
clarify the relationship of facts and values; and, finally,
3. politically, the need for a key (if only partial) antidote
to the onslaught of creationist criticism.
In a complementary contribution, I provide a simple frame-
work for teaching this central topic, addressing the need of
many science teachers to learn our relatively newfound
knowledge, which also has yet to be fully consolidated at an
introductory level (Allchin 2009c). While some examples
from research in the past several decades now appear
occasionally in introductory textbooks—notably, to illustrate
kin selection or inclusive fitness (Allchin 2009b, d)—there is
yet no general framework for addressing them as an
ensemble, nor for integrating them with the rich heritage of
philosophers of ethics. In this parallel essay, I survey the
content that needs to be taught, especially for the teacher
with no specialized background. This conceptual overview is
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supplemented with online resources (images, videos, and
links) and a discussion of teaching strategies (Allchin 2009a)
that may help instructors meet the challenges profiled here.
Elsewhere, I assess the current status of textbooks on this
topic and profile available books and resources on the
scientific content (Allchin 2009d).
A Central Topic in Evolution—and Biology
Why teach biology? Why teach evolution? Primary among
the reasons are that they inform human existence and
deepen a personal understanding of oneself. Darwin's
theory of evolution (or descent with modification, as he
phrased it) was revolutionary. But even in Darwin's time,
no one regarded it as just a theory of "the origin of species"
(divergent speciation), or a handy new way to organize
facts about biogeography, taxonomy, embryology, and
morphology (from apparently "perfect structures" to vesti-
gial organs)—even though it explained all these things. The
major issue—conspicuously understated in the closing of
Darwin's 1859 publication—was the implication for the
organic identity of humans (Ellegård 1958/1990). At one
level, richly caricatured and lampooned, we are cousins to
apes. But deeper awareness arose by considering humans'
apparently distinctive mental traits and behaviors. Darwin
himself lost no time in acknowledging and musing on them.
Within months of documenting his first thoughts about
branching lineages, in late spring of 1838, he had begun
a new private notebook, cryptically labeled 'M': for
man? metaphysics? mind? morality?—all are recorded in
his reflections. Within three months he had filled all 156
pages—still before he had arrived at his insight on natural
selection. One entry is especially vivid and telling:
May not moral sense arise from our enlarged capacity
acting, yet being obscurely guided or strong instinctive
sexual, parental & social instincts, giving rise "do unto
others as yourself". "love they neighbor as thyself".
Analyze this out.— bearing in mind many new relations
from language.— the social instinct more than mere
love,— fear for others acting in unison.— active
assistance &c &c. [M Notebook 150–51]
Darwin was as aware as anybody of the import of his
thinking for morality as a human feature (Allchin 2007a).
There, penned already in 1838, was an outline of an
explanation for the origin of the "moral sense" as a feeling.
He would present that very same theory, publicly and more
fully developed, three decades later in Chapter 3 of The
Descent of Man. In opening that chapter, he boldly asserted:
I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who
maintain that of all the differences between man and
the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by
far the most important. . . . It is the most noble of all
the attributes of man, leading him without a moment's
hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature;
or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep
feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great
cause. (Darwin, 1871, p. 70).
Strictly within a biological context, the natural origin of
morality is central to teaching the basics of evolution as a
whole.
The Challenges of Biological Determinism
and the Fact/Value Distinction
Morality as a topic is all the more important given popular
interpretations of Darwin's concept of adaptation through
natural selection. Natural selection functions through
differential survival and reproduction, preserving only some
individuals' traits for the next generation. The process may
appear competitive and selfish. It seems to preclude any
prospect for cooperation, whether intentional or not. For
example, in an imagined community of sharers (where
sharing is deemed heritable), cheaters can take advantage of
the situation, proliferate at the expense of others, and soon
replace the sharers. According to natural selection—
narrowly construed—cooperation seems self-defeating.
The principles of evolution seem to imply that selfishness
is inherent in nature—hence, "natural," or perhaps essential
to "human nature." Such impressions are easily adopted,
even by staunch Darwinians (Brem et al. 2003). Both
Thomas Henry Huxley, "Darwin's bulldog" in the
nineteenth century, and Michael Ruse, the most strident
defender of evolution in the late twentieth century, each
assumed that non-human nature is inescapably brutish and
so appealed to their conspecifics to affirm their "humanity"
by rising above it (Huxley 1894/1989; Ruse 1986). Their
biological assumption was ultimately unjustified. Mutual-
isms between species abound—most notably in pollination
and seed dispersal and in the endosymbiosis of mitochon-
dria and chloroplasts. Cooperation can be adaptive. It can
foster mutual survival. The same can apply within species.
The contexts whereby natural selection can promote mutual
benefit, while still being "selfish," are not difficult to
understand. But the pervasive rhetoric in our society
supporting the ideologies of individualism and of economic
and academic competition tends to subvert any deeper
understanding of selection. To be a "Survivor®" (according
to CBS's top-10-rated television show) we must "Outwit.
Outplay. Outlast.®" In our culture, no one needs a biology
class to learn how natural selection works. But they likely
do need instruction to unlearn its oversimplifications and
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the misleading impression that moral behavior could never
evolve.
The problem posed by misinterpreting selfishness as
"natural" is compounded by a widespread, yet also
unjustified, tendency to transfer such biology to human
interactions. Popular conceptions exhibit the fallacy of
biological determinism, or viewing behavior and social
interactions reductionistically, as simple extensions of
genetics and organismal biology (Lewontin 1992; Rose
1997). In this perspective, commonly construed as the
epitome of science, selfish Nature (at the biological level)
seems to inevitably dictate a selfish culture (at the social
level). Science can thereby easily be perceived (mistakenly) as
validating moral relativism and political anarchy (Toumey
1997, pp. 112–27). However, cognitive and social structures
shape interactions on higher levels of organization, modify-
ing how individual "lower-level" components function
(Murphy and Brown 2007). Minds and societies each exhibit
"emergent properties" that are consistent with, but not
necessarily easily predicted by, lower-level causes (Holland
1998; Camazine et al. 2001). Exposing the assumptions of
biological determinism is one challenge in addressing
widespread and deep misconceptions about how selection
as a process relates to morality as a product.
A second common misconception is the failure to
understand or apply the fact/value distinction (often called
"the naturalistic fallacy" in ethics). Evolution can interpret
and explain moral behavior. It does not thereby justify any
moral values. Facts about nature, even universal facts or
apparent findings about "human nature," do not constitute
intrinsic values. The term "natural selection" itself can
surely be misleading. Darwin's terminology reflects his
deliberate modeling of natural selection on artificial
selection, based on the analogy of human choice. But
nature does not exhibit intent in its "choices" of differential
survival, any more than a falling body exhibits a "value" of
gravity. Evolutionary science must remain silent with
respect to particular moral values, even if it can explain
behaviors identified as moral or why certain organisms
seem to value some behaviors more than others.
Biological determinism and the conflation of facts and
values are each major errors. Combined together, however,
these two flaws form a potent nemesis to the public
understanding of evolution: what is typically called "social
Darwinism." Even the label is mistaken and misleading.
The view was most prominently developed by Herbert
Spencer, a self-styled philosopher who applied evolution to
interpreting the emerging disciplines of psychology and
sociology. He popularized an extreme biologizing of
society, while linking it to an ideology of "progress"
(Hofstadter 1955, pp. 31–50; Richards 1987, 243–94;
Farber 1994, pp. 38–57). In the late 1800s, Spencer's
works were read far more widely than Darwin. Indeed, it
was Spencer—not Darwin—who coined the phrase "sur-
vival of the fittest" (Spencer 1864a/1924, p. 444; Darwin
1868, p. 21; 1869, p. 101). The catchwords reflected
Spencer's laissez faire political ideology and helped
persuade others that his social doctrine expressed a natural
law (Spencer 1851/1969, 1852a, 1852b, 1864a). The
doctrine that human society follows—or (ideologically)
benefits from—unfettered competition in nature, is thus
more aptly called Spencerism (or possibly, based on even
earlier precedents, Malthusianism or Hobbism; Allchin
2007b). Historian Richard Hofstadter (1955) originally
coined the phrase "social Darwinism" to describe a handful
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century American
industrialists who strongly endorsed Spencer's principles.
Most had never read Darwin. Yet, based on Spencer's
writing, they nonetheless appealed to Darwin's fame and
used unsubstantiated analogies in trying to rationalize
unregulated business and thereby legitimate their privileged
status in society. Hofstadter could hardly have guessed in
1944 how his historical label would ultimately adopt a life
of its own. The name helps link the long-since-discredited
ideas to the accepted science of Darwinism. Students need
to learn that Spencerism is a social ideology, not supported
by biology. In teaching the science fully and responsibly,
we must disentangle Darwinism proper from the perni-
ciously named "social Darwinism."
The second main reason for teaching about the biology
of morality, then, largely amplifies the first. In the absence
of instruction, profound misconceptions develop about the
evolutionary context of ethics and pollute the science.
Worse, perhaps, ideology becomes naturalized, or inscribed
in an inherently immutable and inviolable "nature," under
the guise of scientific principles (Allchin 2008). Responsi-
ble biology teachers will thus address the misconceptions
and profile how the reasoning is mistaken.
Addressing Critics of Evolution
There is yet a third important reason for teaching about the
natural history of ethics: prevalent politically empowered
(but religiously cloaked) criticism of evolution. For many,
the ghastly specter of Spencerism, construed as an
inevitable consequence of evolutionary principles, is unac-
ceptable on religious grounds (Ellegård 1958/1990, 321–
29, and below). Evolution seems to threaten the moral
precepts and guidance integral to their religious convic-
tions. They fear the absence of a moral compass. For them,
Darwinism is ultimately "secular humanism," a doctrine
that will, unchecked, supplant religion with a dangerous
moral void (Toumey 1997). Striving to defend morality and
its religious foundations, these persons dismiss the prob-
lematic science. The desire for moral security as a
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motivation for much anti-evolutionism has, in my view,
been greatly underappreciated.
Such criticism is not surprising in a historical perspec-
tive. Darwin's theory of descent with modification was both
celebrated and condemned when presented in 1859 (Hull
1973). Most popular criticism surrounded the nature of
humans (Ellegård 1958/1990). Some was emotional: the
perceived indignity of "brutish" apes as cousins. Some was
religious: the threats of materialism for the nature of a soul
and a purposeful life. Yet the core concern over Darwinism
was ultimately ethical: did evolution not obliterate the
prospect of morality and a civil society here and now?
(Shurman 1887).
Darwin, of course, addressed the question in 1871 in
Descent of Man, where he sketched a theory of how human
intellectual faculties and, most importantly, the moral sense
might evolve (epigraph above). He presented an explana-
tion for the origin of good will and conscience, based on
four features. First, social animals would develop a social
instinct for helping conspecifics. Second, memory would
foster reflection on violations of that instinct for other short-
term instincts. Third, language would enhance the commu-
nication of emotional states and needs, to facilitate
sympathetic responses. Fourth, habit would develop
(through learning), yielding immediate responses and
spontaneous feelings of duty.
The Edinburgh Review did not respond favorably:
The sense of right and wrong, according to this view
is no definite quality, but merely the result of the
working together of a series of accidents controlled by
natural selection for the general good. We need hardly
point out that if this doctrine were to become popular,
the constitution of society would be destroyed, for if
there be no objective right and wrong, why should we
follow one instinct more than the other, excepting so
far as it is of direct use to ourselves?
London's Guardian echoed the same sentiments, under-
scoring the significance of the issue:
The moral sense or conscience [is] most important to
the true humanity of the individual and to the
maintenance of society. If any theory tends to depose
it from its spiritual throne . . . and makes it but an
instinct differing from others only in the greater
vividness and durability . . . such a theory comes home
to those who care little about abstract metaphysics, and
is pregnant with results which pass beyond the school
lecture room, to affect the great issues of practical life.
(Ellegård 1958/1990, pp. 323–24).
Beyond the school lecture room, indeed. That may signal
modern educators concerned about "scientific literacy." For
many in Darwin's day, human evolution meant abandoning
morality, leaving only social anarchy. Saturday Review
summarized it bluntly in 1859:
No conceivable amount of evidence derived from the
growth and structure of animals and plants would
have the slightest bearing upon our convictions in
regard to the origin of conscience (Ellegård 1958/
1990, p. 325).
The fundamental challenge was—and perhaps still is—
articulating how moral behavior can arise through natural
selection, with its image of dog-eat-dog competition and
selfishness (Larson 2006).
Anti-evolutionists today echo their precedents (Toumey
1997; Paul Nelson, Discovery Institute Fellow, personal
communication, Feb. 16, 2009). The pro-creationist Dis-
covery Institute issued a policy document asserting:
Ever since Darwin's day, people have been concerned
that his theory undercuts morality in the traditional
sense—and they are right (Pearcey 2000).
Critics fault Darwinism (and Darwinism alone) for eugen-
ics, ‘‘ruthless capitalism,’’ hedonism and anarchy (Bergman
2001a, 2001b; Wiker & Demski 2002; West 2007). They
rail against the imagined subversion of moral authority and
order:
. . . We are witnessing the "leading edge" of
evolutionary research drawing towards the inevitable
and logical conclusion that in a world without a God
there is no objective basis for moral truth. There is
only human preference. A frightening, anarchical
proposition. . . .
There can be no such universal principles as ‘right’ or
‘wrong’ in an evolutionary system as there is no higher
authority for such principles than man himself—who is
nomore valuable than his own opinion would deem him
to be (Ramsey 2004)
Like their historical antecedents, modern critics trivialize
evolutionary explanations or fail to understand them:
The evolutionary explanation disembowels morality,
reducing it to mere descriptions of conduct. . . .
When morality is reduced to patterns of behavior
chosen by natural selection for its survival value, then
morality is not explained; it's denied. . . .
What Darwinists cannot do is give us a reason why we
ought not simply copy nature and destroy those who are
weak, unpleasant, costly, or just plain boring. . . .
In the end, we must accept one of two alternatives.
Either we live in a universe in which morality is a
meaningless concept and thus we are forever con-
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demned to silence regarding any moral issue, or moral
rules exist and we're beholden to a moral God who
holds us accountable to his law. There are no other
choices (Koukl 1998).
History may alert modern biology educators to the
challenges in teaching evolution that have persisted ever
since Darwin. Evolution education is not just about
interpreting patterns in fossils, mastering principles of
natural selection, or appreciating some unifying theme in
biology. Nor is it just about profiling the "nature of science"
more effectively. It is also critically about conveying an
understanding of who we are as moral beings in the context
of our organic history.
Rejecting evolution and science based on perceived
ethical implications is ill informed, of course. (Not least is
the failure to distinguish evidential and values-based
reasoning.) Yet current educational practice may bear some
responsibility. Basic knowledge about the relation of
evolution and morality is not part of standard science
curricula. How can anyone then justly feign despair when
such impressions become widely believed? Science cannot
answer purely religious questions, nor dictate personal
beliefs. But for those truly concerned with the status of
morality in the context of evolution, contemporary science
can certainly prove informative. In particular, it may be
important to show explicitly how science does not force a
harsh either-or choice between a moral society or evolutionary
biology. Moral behavior can be a product of human evolution.
Where, alternatively, anti-evolutionism is more political than
religious (Forrest and Gross 2004), the same facts about the
biology of morality may provide important counterargu-
ments to deflect or weaken anti-evolution rhetoric. Teaching
the biology of morality may well be useful politically, as
well as in personal and cultural contexts.
Prospects
Many strong reasons thus support teaching the evolution of
morality. Until relatively recently, however, one might well
have considered the prospect bleak, simply for want of
enough relevant science. Of course, reflections on biology
and ethics have hardly been scarce since 1859 (Farber
1994)—or even before! (Maienschein and Ruse 1999).
Darwin presented his own theory of how moral sense could
evolve in 1871, while his oft-time defender Thomas Huxley
offered a contrary view, of humans cast in a world of
inherent competition. Herbert Spencer promoted evolution
as an engine of progress and thus a "natural" value,
prompting philosopher G.E. Moore in harsh criticism to
articulate the naturalistic fallacy in 1903. Many great
evolutionary biologists in the century following Darwin—
Julian Huxley, C.H. Waddington, Theodius Dobzhansky, G.
G. Simpson, among others—weighed in on the subject of
ethics. In the 1960s, focus shifted to the individual: George
C. Williams (1966) issued a potent critique of "the good of
the species" and William Hamilton (1974) formalized the
notion of inclusive fitness and kin selection. They reflected
in part the outlook of the Cold War era (expressed, too, in
Ardrey's The Territorial Imperative; just as Petr Kropotkin's
1902 Mutual Aid and 1924 Ethics: Origin and Development
had been shaped by Tsarist oppression and Communism in
Russia). Still, they introduced important benchmarks for
thinking critically about natural selection and social
behavior. (A more tempered alternative, reciprocal altruism,
introduced by Robert Trivers in 1971, was mostly over-
shadowed for the next two decades.) In 1975, E.O. Wilson
largely echoed the prevalent genocentric bias in his
Sociobiology, but now tied to substantive field studies
(especially on insects). Wilson's provocative (though brief)
comments on humans sparked considerable debate. Richard
Dawkins took Wilson's stance to an extreme in his popular
1976 The Selfish Gene, while others profiled the poverty of
genetic determinism and its political contexts (Lewontin et
al. 1984). Wilson's book also motivated a Dahlem Confer-
ence that brought together experts from primatology,
psychology, child moral development, cultural and social
anthropology, neurobiology, legal philosophy, and other
fields (Stent 1978), a model for further interdisciplinary
discourse. Ultimately, questions about sociobiology helped
motivate a generation of fruitful new research. More
research yielded more understanding. For example, Florida
scrub jays appeared to exhibit kin selection by helping to
raise siblings even when reproductively mature. Woolfen-
den and Fitzpatrick (1978) soon discovered a more complex
(and more interesting) scenario of social costs and benefits.
Such studies over the past three decades—of chimps and
bonobos, macaques and meerkats, bees, wasps and ants,
Belding ground squirrels and sticklebacks, vampire bats
and naked mole rats, and more—have greatly enhanced our
knowledge of the biology and evolutionary contexts of
ethics. Research has emerged in complementary fields:
neurobiology, cognitive development, social psychology,
cultural anthropology, economics, etc. The science is now
fairly robust (although far from complete!). In addition,
there are ample cases to illustrate a handful of significant
core concepts in the classroom.
Understanding has been further enriched since the late
1980s by contributions from the history and philosophy of
biology. In 1981, philosopher Michael Ruse testified on the
nature of science at the Arkansas trial on teaching
creationism. He continued to debate creationism publicly
and on one occasion (in a television make-up room)
creationist Duane Gish asked him how any self-respecting
evolutionist could believe in a moral society. As a response,
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Ruse wrote Taking Darwin Seriously (1986), a philosoph-
ical reappraisal of Darwin's, Huxley's, and others' views.
Shortly thereafter (in 1990), the Field Museum in Chicago
devoted its renowned annual spring systematics symposium
to evolution and ethics (Nitecki and Nitecki 1993). In 1987,
historian Robert Richards published an award-winning
volume, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary
Theories of Mind and Behavior. Since these benchmarks,
historians and philosophers of science have given increas-
ing focus to ethics as an evolutionary issue. In the last
decade, biologists and philosophers have deepened their
dialogue. Philosopher Elliot Sober and biologist David
Sloan Wilson (1998) collaborated in an insightful analysis
of altruism and group selection. Similarly, primatologist
Frans de Waal has opened his interpretations of primate
behavior to critique by philosophers (de Waal 2006; Katz
2004). The field of the biology of morality is thus also
developing and benefitting from greater philosophical
sophistication.
On the occasion of the Darwin bicentennial (and the
sesquicentennial of the Origin of Species), we might find
some newfound confidence about the outlines of the
evolution of morality, echoing Darwin's concerns—yet also
updated with modern research. While current textbooks do
typically address this topic, the treatment is generally
incomplete and tends to exhibit an outmoded reductionistic
bias (fuller, more detailed analysis in Allchin 2009b, d).
Updating knowledge on this topic may be challenging and
require a little extra homework for teachers. What does
someone need to know to understand the evolution and
biology of morality effectively? Not that much, really. The
basic concepts and examples already available in standard
textbooks need to be simply highlighted, extended, and
further synthesized. In a complementary paper, therefore, I
provide a textbook-insert and an organizational framework
of this rapidly growing field (Allchin 2009c). Accompa-
nying classroom resources (including images and video
links) and a discussion of teaching strategies are available
online (Allchin 2009a). A survey of books is provided in
another contribution (Allchin 2009d). With these resources,
we may teach more fully what evolution means—not just as
a unifying principle of biology, but as a great insight into
what it means to be a human with a deep organic history.
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